Compliance Verification Activity Report: CV1718-300 - Enbridge Pipelines Inc.


Compliance verification activity type: Field Inspection

Activity #: CV1718-300
Start date: 2017-11-27
End date: 2017-11-30


Regulated company: Enbridge Pipelines Inc.

Operating company: Enbridge Pipelines Inc.

Province(s) / Territory(s):


Rationale and scope:

Construction Inspection L3RP (OC-63 & AO-1-XO-E101-004-2016) Spread 4, between Moose Jaw and Regina, looking at pipe handling, mainline welding, the Qu’Appelle River DPI, and Civil works at Bethune Pump Station located in Spread 4.

Compliance tool(s) used:

Facility details


Regulatory requirements

Regulatory requirements that apply to this activity:

Regulatory instrument number(s):

Additional Project-specific requirements or conditions:

Please note: XO-E101-004-2016 has been amended and is now in effect. Inspectors should reference AO-001-E101-004-2016

Observations (no outstanding follow-up required)

Observation 1 - Observations

Date & time of visit: 2017-11-28 08:00

Discipline: Integrity Management




Observations for 28 November 2017
Direct Pipe Installation (DPI) site at the Qu’Appelle River
Latitude 50.60230 oN and Longitude -105.19684 oW
Michel’s is the company that was contracted by Enbridge to cross the Qu’Appelle River. The procedure used to cross the Qu’Appelle River is Direct Pipe Installation (DPI). NEB Inspectors arrived at the DPI site at 9:00 am. NEB Inspectors, Enbridge staff, and Michel’s employees met for a site specific safety orientation and signed off on safety documentation.
During the site specific safety orientation, Michel’s staff stated the following:

  1. Stay clear of any moving equipment.
  2. DPI was completed on November 27, 2017 around 13:30.
  3. Michel’s daily tasks consisted of disassembling the equipment and de-mobilizing from the site.
  4. The majority of Michel’s operational equipment was still in place and NEB staff would be able to examine the site and the installation procedure.
  5. The type of soil that was drilled through was mostly silt and clay that was collected at the soil sorting facility, there was very little sand content in the soil (less than 1-2%) and no gravel was encountered.
  6. The maximum pipe depth is approximately 6.0 m.
  7. The pipe punched out at the exit pit location with a precision of 0.5 m.
  8. The length of the DPI was 260 m approximately.
After the completion of the site specific safety orientation, Michel’s staff accompanied NEB Inspectors and Enbridge staff on a tour of the DPI site. The following observations were made:
  1. A soil sorting facility is placed near the entry point and was used to sort soil (separation unit) and slurry product to refine slurry water to be reused for further drilling during operation.
  2. A 19.8 m, 48” caisson was installed by excavating the surrounding soil near the entry point to facilitate the DPI installation, this caisson is to be removed when the DPI demobilization is completed.
  3. The DPI thruster’s drilling capability is 750 metric tons but only 20 metric tons were needed at this site.
  4. The pipe was pushed at a rate of about 80 mm per minute by the thruster.
  5. The pipe will be further pushed into the ground at the entry location using the pipe thruster for another few meters then the caisson will be removed.
  6. At the exit point the pipe is up in the air and the highest point is approximately at 4.4 m below existing ground surface. Some water ponding was observed at the bottom of the exit point excavation. NEB Inspectors enquired about the source of the water at this site and Michel’s representative indicated that it is groundwater. Some sloughing of the side of the excavation was observed indicating some stability issues. In addition a couple of ladders were noted to have been used to provide access to the excavation. NEB Inspectors advised Enbridge and Michel’s staff of the need to stay out of the excavation until shoring or trench boxes were used to provide a safe and proper working space to employees needing to work in the excavation.
  7. NEB Inspectors enquired about the backfill material that will be used at the excavated locations, Michel’s staff advised that the excavations will be backfilled by SA Energy and not by Michel’s. Enbridge staff commented that the excavation will most likely be backfilled with the material that was originally excavated.
  8. NEB Inspectors enquired about the site restoration, Michel’s staff replied that the site will be restored by SA Energy.
Slope Qu’Appelle River South – Site 34
Latitude 50.59444 oN and Longitude -105.17738 oW
At 10:30 am, NEB inspectors met with two Geotechnical Specialists from BGC Engineering and a field engineer from Enbridge at the Slope named Qu’Appelle River South – Site 34. This site is considered a geohazard site requiring site specific mitigation design. The site is located uphill of Enbridge’s mainline corridor while the majority of the Line 3 Replacement Pipeline (L3RP) is located downhill of the mainline corridor. The Geotechnical Specialists explained the mitigation implemented at this site as well as the monitoring that is currently in progress and that will be done post construction. According to Enbridge’s field engineer, the pipeline at this site is heavy wall (that is, has a wall thickness of 15.1 mm) to provide additional strength to the pipe given its closeness to the Bethune Pump Station’s discharge and its situation on a slope with a steep gradient. Site conditions were as described by the Geotechnical specialist:
  1. The nearby gravel pit was the source of some ingressing water to the slope.
  2. The excavated soil at this site consisted mainly of glacial till deposit. Glacial till is a heteregenous mixture that may contain silt, clay, sand, and gravel.
  3. Some pockets of sand and gravel (alluvial deposits) were also encountered on the side slopes of the excavation, ingress water was seeping through this deposit.
  4. Drainage will be installed (sub drain and ditchline drain) to divert the water to the bottom of the hill and off the Right Of Way (ROW).
  5. The excavated cut for the pipe installation slopes down at 22% to 25% or 4H:1V.
  6. Pipe string all ready to be lowered into the excavation.
At the end of the inspection at this location all visitors’ boots were washed to prevent possible club root transfer from the site to other locations.

Slope Qu’Appelle River North Gully #1 – Site 33
Latitude 50.61767 oN and Longitude -105.23812 oW
At 11:00 am, NEB Inspectors arrived at the Slope named Qu’Appelle River North Gully #1 – Site 33 accompanied by the BGC Engineering Geotechnical Specialists and Enbridge’s field engineer. Similarly to previously visited slope, this site is also considered a geohazard site requiring site specific mitigation design. The Geotechnical Specialists explained that at this site:
  1. Large cuts had been created to prevent landslide.
  2. It is undesirable to cause any slope movement.
  3. Subdrainage would be implemented post construction near the gully to prevent any potential slope movement.
  4. Ground surface conditions consisted mainly of glacial till (mix of sand, gravel, silt and clay).
  5. Groundwater was not observed at this location.
  6. Geotechnical specialists mentioned that they are collecting samples from the site and testing to keep a record of the soil properties for future analysis.
  7. Pipe burial will be at depth ranging between 1.2 m and 4.0 m with the intention to keep pipe near surface as much as possible for easy access.

Slope Qu’Appelle River North Gully #2 and #3 – Site 33
Latitude 50.61767 oN and Longitude -105.23812 oW
At 11:30 am, NEB inspectors walked over to the slope named Qu’Appelle River North Gully #2 which is not identified as a geohazard site. This slope is located between gully #1 and #3 within Site 33. Gully #2 was observed to have similar soil conditions as Gully #1 and #3, however is a bit shallower than the other gullies. Groundwater was not observed at this location.
NEB Inspectors walked over to the slope named Qu’Appelle River North Gully #3 which is identified as a typical geohazard site. Geotechnical specialists did not identify any need for mitigation at this location. Soil conditions at this location are similar to those observed at Gully #1 and Gully #2. Groundwater was not observed at this location.
Observations for 29 November 2017
Bethune Pump Station and Safety Orientation
Latitude: 50.62077 oN and Longitude: -105.2415 oW
NEB Inspectors arrived at the Bethune Pump Station at 8:50 am. Upon arrival at the station NEB Inspectors, Enbridge staff, and Mastec employees met for a site specific safety orientation and signed off on required documentation. The Bethune Pump Station is located within Spread 4. The Bethune Pump Station expansion consists of the addition of a pump house, electric unit, and Line 3 main pipeline.
During the site specific safety orientation the following topics were discussed:

  1. Muster point and evacuation procedure.
  2. Stay clear of moving equipment.
  3. Wind sock locations and indication.
  4. NEB Inspectors were informed that a work permit would be completed specifically for the NEB inspection.
Once the safety orientation was complete, the NEB inspectors were provided with the following information:
  1. The Bethune Pump Station is the first of 9 pump stations to be built and is currently at the civil stage of construction. Steel cages to support the concrete stages have been installed. The concrete stages are intended for the building and pump foundations.
  2. A total of three pumps will be placed in a pump building for the new Line 3.
  3. The substation will be upgraded.
  4. The following existing Enbridge lines run through the station:
    1. Line 1
    2. Line 2
    3. Line 3
    4. Line 4
    5. Line 13
    6. Line 67
Note: Line 13 is the only line that is not associated with pump units at this station.
  1. Helical pile installation had already been completed prior to the inspection. Helical piles are used as the foundation system to support the pump station, the electrical components and the pipeline where it is located above grade. NEB Inspectors requested the as-built documentation and the construction drawings for comparison purposes. Upon reviewing the documentation, the following topics were discussed:
    1. NEB Inspectors enquired if the piles were driven to the design depth and was informed by the Mastec representative that some of the pile did not reach the required minimum depth of embedment.
    2. Within the piling records, it was noted that, at some locations, the minimum depth of embedment was not achieved however the torque obtained during pile driving exceeded the required torque.
    3. NEB Inspectors were informed that the design engineer was consulted about the lack of pile embedment at those pile locations and that the design engineer recommended the placement of geofoam in order to reduce the potential for frost penetration and therefore reduce potential for pile uplift.
    4. Mastec representative stated that in the case that the minimum embedment was not obtained the torque at the time of driving was compared to the value required by design to confirm that the driving torque was equivalent or exceeded the required torque value.
  2. Within the Bethune station, the mainline was installed by Mastec. Only one Welding Procedure was used to complete the 28 welds that were needed to build the mainline within the station. The welds were done as per Welding Procedure Specification (WPS) MC-13 Revision 0. Copies of the WPS, its associated datasheet as well as the weld procedure and NDT Matrix Form were provided to NEB Inspectors. The welding parameters are checked once per shift (i.e. a shift is 10 days) by the Welding Inspector. The Welding Inspector is Mastec’s Quality Representative. NEB Inspectors observed the welding qualification records for the two welders on site demonstrating that the welders are qualified to perform these welds. The station’s last weld will be completed today.
  3. Radiographic Testing (RT) is performed on all the welds by a third party contractor (Team). So far, no repairs were deemed necessary.
  4. After RT is complete, coating technicians prepare the surface of the weld by sandblasting and pre-heating the weld area before applying liquid epoxy on the girth weld. The coating technicians are qualified NACE Level 2. Repairs are done if detected by the jeeping process.
The Mastec representative stated that the following activities were in progress at the pump station:
  1. Pump station construction.
  2. Mainline pipe welding.
  3. Excavation and backfilling.
  4. Pond reconstruction.
  5. Driving helical pile for foundation support.
  6. Concrete slabs and rebar activities.
After the points discussed above, Mastec’s staff accompanied NEB Inspectors and Enbridge staff on a tour of the Bethune Pump Station. The following observations were made:
  1. The open excavation where the pipeline welding was taking place had a side slope inclination steeper or equivalent to 1H:1V with slope cut through glacial till. The bottom of the excavation was dry. Ladders and steps were placed to provide access to and egress from the excavation and welding work space.
  2. Mainline welding activities were taking place within the excavation at the time of inspection. NEB Inspectors witnessed the weld area being pre-heated. NEB Inspectors confirmed that the pre-heat temperature is verified with a stick (i.e. a temperature stick for 150 oC was being used as per WPS MCI-13 Revision 0). NEB Inspectors observed the welders performing a fill pass. NEB Inspectors verified that the correct weld rods were being used during the pass (i.e. electrode AWS E8018-C3 as per WPS MCI-13 Rev. 0).
  3. Existing emergency pond was disturbed by pipeline installation. NEB Inspectors noted that the area of the pond was being backfilled and prepared for liner installation. Geotextile liner was keyed in at one side of the pond to be rolled out when the pond base is ready.
  4. Given that Line 3’s pump building will be very similar to Line 67’s pump building, NEB Inspectors visited the pump building associated with Line 67 to better understand the current construction work being done on Line 3’s building.
  5. The NEB Inspectors observed the piles where the minimum depth of embedment was not achieved and noted that the excavation for the geofoam placement was made but the geofoam was not installed at the time of the inspection. After the inspection, NEB Inspectors obtained confirmation that the geofoam were put in place. 
Welding at Road 122
Latitude 50.46286 oN and Longitude -104.92171 oW
At 2:30 pm, NEB Inspectors arrived at welding activities taking place in the vicinity of Road 122. Upon arrival, NEB Inspectors reviewed and signed in on site specific risk assessment. NEB Inspectors observed:
  1. The Main Gang conducting a mechanized welding process, more specifically WPS No. ENB-A-WPS-54 Rev 4 for pipe with 914 mm outside diameter (OD) and wall thickness (WT) of 11.88 mm and 12.7 mm.
  2. The Main Gang preheating the pipe using propane torches. NEB Inspectors were informed that a wax temperature stick is used to test that the pipe is heated to the correct temperature (which is 50 oC as per WPS). A thermal sleeve is placed on the pre-heated section to maintain the heat until the root pass can be done.
  3. An internal clamp assembly and its arm (also known as the goose) used to weld the root pass. NEB Inspectors were informed that the internal weld takes approximately one minute to complete. Based on a visual inspection and the data on the meters associated with the clamp assembly, a root pass can be determined to require repair in the form of a back weld. Examples of imperfections that trigger such a repair are porosity and lack of fusion. When a back weld is deemed necessary, a welder needs to go inside the pipe and perform the back weld as per WPS No. ENB-A-WPS-54 Rev 4 for optional back welds. NEB Inspectors witnessed one back weld being conducted. NEB Inspectors were informed that approximately one back weld is performed every day.
  4. A hot pass weld in action inside the shack (Shack No.1). One welder completed a counter clockwise welding pass on one side of the pipe, then grinded the start/stop sections. A second welder completed a clockwise weld on the other side of the pipe, then grinded the start/stop sections. The Welding Procedure Data Sheet (WPDS) associated with WPS No. ENB-A-WPS-54 Rev 4, more specifically L3R-WPDS-1-Rev 4 was observed to be posted in the shack. The Welding foreman stated that all welders are tested in SA Energy’s yard to qualify, prior to working on the Project. Welder identification numbers for each pass done on each side of the weld are written directly on the pipe.
  5. The passes done in the shack associated with fill 1 and 2 passes (Shack No.3). NEB Inspectors noted a superseded version of the L3R-WPDS-1 (i.e. Rev 2 instead of Rev 4) was posted in the shack. NEB Inspectors were informed that the WPDS would be updated accordingly. The Welding Foreman described that parameters such as voltage, amperage, wire speed, travel speed, tilt and distance from top are preset prior to welding and as per the WPS. The Welding Foreman explained that shacks are divided as per the following:
    1. Shack No. 1 is responsible for the Hot pass.
    2. Shack No. 2 and 3 are responsible for the fill 1 and 2 passes.
    3. Shack No. 4, 5 and 6 are responsible for the strip and final cap.
  6. A thermal sleeve placed on the weld area to maintain the heat until the subsequent shack is positioned and ready to conduct the next pass.
  7. NEB Inspectors were informed that at the end of the day, a total of approximately 85 welds will have been completed.

Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) at Road 122
Latitude 50.46286 oN and Longitude -104.92171 oW
At 15:30, NEB Inspectors walked down the spread to observe NDT taking place downstream of the welding activities. NEB Inspectors noted that:

  1. Automated ultrasonic testing (AUT) method was used. The scanner was mounted on the welding band and water was applied around the weld acting as a couplant during the scan.
  2. In the AUT truck, a binder containing Applus RTD procedures and Enbridge’s specifications.
  3. The UT technician described his evaluation of the AUT results for a total of three welds displayed on his computer monitor. No defects were identified in these welds.
  4. On his computer monitor, the UT technician also showed an example of a weld that was deemed to require a repair (weld had been done on the previous day). During his analysis of the AUT results for this weld, the UT technician detected evidence of lack of fusion within one of the fill passes and recommended that the weld be repaired. The weld was repaired according to WPS No. ENB-M-R2-WPS-01 Rev.0. The Welding Foreman stated that on this spread, the repair rate for mainline welding was 1%. The Welding Foreman informed NEB Inspectors that the day before, 189 welds were performed and only three repairs were necessary.
  5. NEB inspectors observed the calibration of the scanner. The UT technician stated that calibration is required either hourly, or at every 10th weld. The calibration of the AUT scanner was done as a demonstration for the NEB Inspectors.
Observations for 30 November 2017
Coating at Road 114
Latitude 50.55268 oN and Longitude -105.07623 oW
At 9:30 am, NEB Inspectors arrived at a site in the vicinity of Road 114. The NEB Inspectors made the following observations:
  1. A torch attached to a propane tank was placed under the pipe ready to be used. The Field Surveillance for Coating explained that the weld areas need to be heated before sand blasting.
  2. A pipe joint had “Do not bend” marked on the mill applied fusion bonded epoxy (FBE). The Field Surveillance for Coating stated that the coating mill writes this on pipe joints that are coated with FBE of a thickness exceeding 16 mils. This practice originates from the fact that in laboratory tests, FBE coating with a thickness of more than 16 mils begins to crack at -30oC and the marking on the coated pipe is meant as a warning sign. According to the Field Surveillance for Coating, if Enbridge really needed to bend a pipe joint with this type of marking it would do so while taking special care that the bend is conducted at temperatures above -30oC.
  3. The wells are preheated and sand blasted prior to coating using an induction coil.
  4. Field welds coated with liquid epoxy applied by spray. The coating is mixed inside a truck that closely follows the coating crew along the pipeline and supplies the liquid epoxy coating to the technicians via nozzles. The coating technicians used protective clothing. Before the coating is sprayed onto the surface of the field weld, a shack is installed at the weld and a tarp is positioned underneath the weld such that the weld is surrounded and all coating splatters are contained (i.e. not left on the ground below or the environment surrounding the pipeline).
  5. The Coating Inspector explained that the thickness of the coating applied on every weld is measured. The thickness measurements as well as the Coating Applicators’ identification number for each weld (in this case, weld number L3R-4-ML-1757) are written directly on the coated weld, this information is then recorded and archived.
NEB Inspectors were informed that:
  1. After the sand blasting step, visual inspection and profile testing are done at a frequency of 1 in every 25 welds or every hour whichever occurs first.
  2. After the coating is applied, the coating is further heated to promote curing.
  3. V-notch testing to check for coating adhesion is done at a frequency of 1 in every 50 welds.
  4. The coating process is followed by a jeeping process to detect any holidays in the coating.
  5. V-notches and holidays detected in the coating are repaired using a new device that is comprised of an induction plate with coils and magnets that provide preheat of the surface before repair coating can be applied and post curing for the coating once applied.
Jeeping and Coating Repairs at Road 107
Latitude 50.6269 oN and Longitude -105.2634 oW
At 11:00am, NEB Inspectors arrived at a site in the vicinity of Road 107. NEB Inspectors witnessed three welds being jeeped with a voltage of 3,3 kV and no discontinuities in the coating were detected at these welds. NEB Inspectors were informed that at the welds, the coating is thicker than the mill applied FBE. As an example, the Repair Technician measured the thickness of the coating at one weld and at a location on the mill applied FBE that were equivalent to 47.6 mils and 17.5 mils, respectively. For this reason, the coating at the welds is jeeped at a higher voltage (i.e. approximately 3,3 kV) while the mill applied FBE is jeeped at a lower voltage (i.e. approximately 2,3 kV). However, when the entire pipe segment is finally jeeped before lowering into the trench, the coating is jeeped at a voltage between 1,8 and 2,1 kV to prevent coating damage (i.e. burning with high voltages).
NEB inspectors then observed the repair of one of the holidays that were detected during jeeping. NEB inspectors were informed that once a coating repair is complete, it is tested once at the start of the day and once every hour after the initial test using one or all of the following methods:
  1. Pre-heat temperature using a contact thermometer
  2. Thickness
  3. Hardness using a durometer
Trenching at Road 102
Latitude 50.6662 oN and Longitude -105.3743 oW
At 1:00pm, NEB Inspectors arrived at a site in the vicinity of Road 102. NEB Inspectors observed trenching activities performed by a ditching wheel.

Pipe Lowering-in at Road 99
Latitude: 50.6878 oN and Longitude: -105.4340 oW
NEB Inspectors arrived at the pipe lowering-in location in the vicinity of Road 99 around 3:30pm. Upon arrival at this location NEB Inspectors, Enbridge staff, and SA Energy employees met and signed off on the safety documentation.
During the site specific safety orientation the following topics were discussed:
  1. Stay clear of moving equipment and pinch points.
  2. Watch out for trips and slips.
By the time the safety orientation was complete, the booms were positioned for lowering-in and ready to start moving the pipe into the ditch. NEB staff, Enbridge and SA Energy employees observed a portion of the pipe being lowered-in. The following observations were made:
  1. Three side booms were positioned to start the initial pipe lifting.
  2. When the pipe was lifted off the wooden skids the three side booms moved down the line and the fourth side boom joined the line up to assist in pipe lowering.
  3. The start of the pipe was then supported by the fourth side boom. Once the side boom got a good handle on the pipe, it initiated pipe lowering into the trench while steering the pipe to be placed at a proper location within the ditch.
  4. A visual inspection of the ditch was performed during lowering, a rock was spotted in the ditch and was subsequently removed by one of the workers prior to pipe entering the ditch.
  5. The start point of the pipe was placed on a wooden skid where tie in would take place when the remainder of the pipe is in place.
SA Energy representative stated that:
  1. A final jeep and repair is performed prior to lowering-in the pipe.
  2. Both final jeep and repair operations are performed by the same crew.
  3. If a defect is found during final jeeping the lowering-in activities are stopped until the repair is performed.
  4. Any large and unexpected deposits such as gravel or cobbles that are encountered within the excavation prior to lowering-in are removed and dealt with prior to pipeline lowering.
Horizontal Directional Bore (HDB) at Road 99
Latitude: 50.6878 oN and Longitude: -105.4340 oW
At 4:00pm, NEB Inspectors walked over to a Horizontal Directional Boring (HDB) site located close to the lowering-in activities.  NEB Inspectors were accompanied by Enbridge staff and SA Energy staff. Upon arrival at this location NEB Inspectors, Enbridge staff, and SA Energy employees met and signed off on the safety documentation. At the time that NEB staff arrived at the HDB site had already punched through and the crew were getting ready to shut down for the day. The following observations were made:
  1. The drill rig was positioned at the entry point.
  2. A supply truck and a water tank were positioned near the drill rig.
  3. Two reamers were on a skid near the drill rig.
  4. An open cut excavation was made at the exit point.
  5. The first pass was completed prior to the inspection.
  6. A pull was attached to the pipe to be able to pull it though the drilled hole.
Enbridge representative stated that:
  1. HDB is a smaller version of the Horizontal Directional Drilling (HDD) crossing technique that involves crossing short distances with minor pipe curvatures.
  2. The pipe will be approximately positioned at 3.0 m below ground surface.
  3. The HDB procedure consists of three passes, the first pass is performed by a 7” bit, the second pass is performed by 26” reamer and the third pass is performed by a 36” reamer.
  4. Water is used instead of slurry during this installation.
  5. The pipe will be pulled through the drill hole after the third reamer pass is completed.
  6. The operation was terminated after the first pass and will have to be completed on the following day.

Compliance tool used: No compliance tool used

Observations (company follow-up required)

Identified non-compliances to company plans or procedures are non-compliances either to:

- the condition of an authorization document that requires the implementation of that plan or procedure; or

- the relevant section of the regulations that requires implementation of that plan or procedure including those sections that require implementation of plans or procedures as a part of a Program