Compliance Verification Activity Report: CV1819-373 - Algonquin Tinker Gen Co.

Overview

Compliance verification activity type: Field Inspection

Activity #: CV1819-373
Start date: 2018-09-13
End date: 2018-09-13

Team:

Regulated company: Algonquin Tinker Gen Co.

Operating company: Liberty Utilities

Province(s) / Territory(s):

Discipline(s):

Rationale and scope:

Joint integrity and environment inspection of two 69 kV transmission lines. The purpose of the inspection was to verify compliance to CSA C22.1 No.15 or earlier version of the Canadian Electrical Code, CSA C22.3 No. 15 or earlier versions for Overhead transmission lines, NERC reliability standards where applicable, and company plans, manuals, and procedures and the NEB Conditions issued by the Board in the instrument. Both lines run from the Tinker Generating Station to the USA border. Line 6901 is approximately 2.5 km long and was upgraded (restringing and pole replacement) in 2016. Line 6904 is approximately 2 km long and was built in the 1960s; it underwent a partial upgrade in 2016. The integrity scope of the inspection included maintenance of the right-of-way (RoW), the structural integrity of the line, protective relays and battery banks, and company documentation. The environmental scope of the inspection included, but was not limited to, avian protection, watercourse crossings, vegetation management, invasive species management, and environmental training and monitoring practices.

Compliance tool(s) used:

Facility details

Facilities:

Regulatory requirements

Regulatory requirements that apply to this activity:

Observations (no outstanding follow-up required)

Observation 1 - General Observations - Integrity

Date & time of visit: 2018-09-13 09:25

Discipline: Integrity Management

Categories:

Facility:

Observations:

General Observations:
Line 6904:

Line 6901:

Compliance tool used: No compliance tool used

Observation 2 - Specific Observations on Line 6904

Date & time of visit: 2018-09-13 11:00

Discipline: Integrity Management

Categories:

Facility:

Observations:

6904:

Deliverables for the ATG for 6904 line
Please provide the following as per the deadline shown:


1. Provide a plan by 31 May 2019 to outline when ATG will be able to install the shield wire and grounding for the remaining poles of 6904 line. If ATG decides not to install the shield wire and the grounding for the remaining poles of 6904, explain the rationale how ATG adheres to the safety regulations those applicable in Canada.
2. Inform the NEB staff by 7 December 2018 of the nature of the preservative that has been used and the reason for bleeding in Pole No.9.
3. Provide a visual image confirming the removal of the porcelain from the Pole No.10 by 7 December 2018.
4. Check the integrity of the crossbar of Pole No. 11, assess its serviceability and confirm it to the NEB by 31 May 2019 whether it needs immediate replacement.
 

Compliance tool used: No compliance tool used

Observation 3 - Specific Observations on Line 6901

Date & time of visit: 2018-09-13 14:50

Discipline: Integrity Management

Categories:

Facility:

Observations:

6901:

Deliverability of ATG:
ATG will replace the number plate of the Pole 165 and confirm to the NEB with a visual image by 7 December 2018

Compliance tool used: No compliance tool used

Observation 4 - Substation and Control Room

Date & time of visit: 2018-09-13 16:30

Discipline: Integrity Management

Categories:

Facility:

Observations:

Substation and Control Room:

Substation: The old 50 MVA 138/69 kV transformer has been replaced with the new 100 MVA 138/69 kV transformer. The associated circuit breakers are also replaced with the change. The substation grounding were checked and was found to be satisfactory.

Control Room: The ATG maintains access control to both the substation and the control rooms and consistent with the requirements of the NERC CIP standards. The batteries are Gel type batteries and for 1 year old. The room also houses the A and B protective relays for both the transformer and for the 6901 and 6904 lines. The room is temperature controlled and accordingly meets the CSA 22.1 and IEEE requirements of ventilation control of the battery room.

Deliverability of ATG:
ATG to provide the battery test results and the routine battery test programs to the NEB by 7 December 2018.

Compliance tool used: No compliance tool used

Observation 5 - General Observations - Environment

Date & time of visit: 2018-09-13 11:00

Discipline: Environmental Protection

Categories:

Facility:

Observations:

General

VegetationWildlifeDeliverables
Please provide the following information to the NEB Inspectors via email by 7 December 2018:

Compliance tool used: No compliance tool used

Observation 6 - Revised deliverable based on code requirements and follow-up of an outstanding deliverable

Date & time of visit: 2019-04-26 09:00

Discipline: Integrity Management

Categories:

Facility:

Observations:

Under Item No.1 in the deliverables for Line 6904, ATG was required to submit a plan by 31 May 2019 outlining when ATG will be able to install the shield wires and implement grounding for the remaining poles of Line 6904. ATG confirmed that it was reviewing the request along with the codes and standards requirements. The NEB staff would like to clarify the following:

Section 9.1.2.2.1 of CSA 22.3 No.1-15 requires that “Metal poles or the reinforcing metal of concrete poles, where such poles carry supply-line conductors” carrying supplying conductors of 22 kV or less shall be effectively grounded. No such grounding requirements are specified for towers or poles above 22 kV. However, if the towers are not effectively grounded, that may cause the following safety concerns when the tower footing resistance is too high:

  1. The Ground Potential Rise (GPR) during a lightning strike.
  2. During a lightning strike, the tower voltage goes up considerably high due to the lack of effective grounding. The impact is even more during a positive lightning strike due to the higher surge current. The high tower voltage can cause a flashover to the live supply conductor across the insulator and trigger a line to ground fault. The phenomena is known as ‘back flash over’. For wood poles, burning of the wood poles is a common occurrence.
  3. The increase in GPR is also a safety concern for any live stock or human being in close proximity of the towers or wood poles due to the step and touch potential for steady state or fault conditions.
While we are not in a position to comment on the rationale as to why the grounding requirement for supply lines equal or below 22 kV poles are different than for the voltage class above 22 kV, we would like to point out that it is a good engineering practice to ground all poles and towers to minimize any damages during abnormal condition of a power system. Many utilities are adopting the practice of grounding every tower for safety and performance of their lines.

However, if a guy is connected to a pole, the grounding requirements are governed by section 4.2.7.1 of CSA 22.3 No.1-15 where it states that “Guys located such that the failure of the guys or nearby supply conductors could result in contact with supply conductors shall be effectively grounded or insulated”. This is to keep in mind that, if there are no shield wires installed, lightning may strike a power conductor directly and can cause further damage and safety hazards.

In view of the above information, one deliverable has been revised. NEB staff would also like to follow up with one additional deliverable, as listed below:

ATG Deliverables:
  1. Recognizing it as a good engineering practice to ensure safety and integrity, ATG is to confirm whether it will install the shield wires and implement grounding for all the poles along Line 6904. If ATG decides not to install the shield wires and grounding for the remaining poles, please explain the mitigation plan as to how ATG will minimize the damage under lightning strikes and ensure safety against Ground Potential Rise during the lightning. Please submit your response by 31 May 2019.
  2. Under item No. 4 for previous Line 6904 deliverables, the NEB requested ATG to submit a plan by 31 May 2019 when it can check the integrity and serviceability of the crossbar of pole No. 11. In its response, ATG confirmed that the site was not accessible yet by the service crews due to deep snow. ATG shall confirm if it is still feasible to check the crossbar by 31 May 2019. If it is not feasible to access the pole by service truck on or before 31 May 2019, please submit a plan with an estimated time for when ATG can check the crossbar.

     
     

Compliance tool used: No compliance tool used

Observations (company follow-up required)

Identified non-compliances to company plans or procedures are non-compliances either to:

- the condition of an authorization document that requires the implementation of that plan or procedure; or

- the relevant section of the regulations that requires implementation of that plan or procedure including those sections that require implementation of plans or procedures as a part of a Program